Against the backdrop of the Île Longue nuclear military base, on the third day of attacks by the United States of America and Israel on Iran, Emmanuel Macron took to the podium this afternoon to make an announcement that many, particularly within Europe, had been hoping to hear for months, if not years.
“Today we can take a new step forward in France’s deterrence,” said the French president at the base in north-western France which houses the country’s nuclear submarines. “We must strengthen our nuclear deterrent in the face of the combination of threats we face, and we must devise our deterrence strategy within the European continent, whilst fully respecting our sovereignty, through the gradual implementation of what I shall call ‘forward deterrence’. To be free, we must be feared, and to be feared, we must be powerful.”
The issue of the “strategic dialogue” now getting underway is not new: in 2020, a month after Donald Trump left the White House, Macron had already tried to initiate it with his European partners, but was largely ignored. And that was not his first attempt. “Basically, everyone now agrees with what Macron said in 2017,” when he was elected President of France, Julien Hoez, a geopolitical analyst and editor of The French Dispatch, points out to CNN. “They’re nine years behind, but better late than never, right? Finally, we’re going to have a proper European nuclear deterrent.”
A new paradigm
The changes are numerous and unprecedented, starting with the closer cooperation between France and Germany on security and defence. On the nuclear front, Hoez argues, “Germany has always been in a holding pattern, primarily due to the drama of having reduced its nuclear power generation capacity following the closure of its power stations, but what has happened now is that, although still hesitant regarding French weapons, the Germans seem to have finally realised that they have to work with the French”. Why? “Because things are becoming ridiculously unstable, to such an extent that there was no other way.”
So ridiculously unstable that we are facing an obvious return to the MAD theory, or Mutual Assured Destruction, a military strategy that prevailed during the Cold War in which, faced with the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by two rival sides that would result in the annihilation of both attacker and defender, the focus was on deterrence, with the capability to retaliate ensuring that neither would initiate a conflict.
In his speech, Macron put forward three arguments for expanding France’s nuclear arsenal and shifting the European paradigm, citing Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s growing military might and the US’s new defence priorities, as set out in the much-discussed National Security Strategy presented by the Trump administration at the end of last year.
“Much of this has to do primarily with Russia and the US,” says Julien Hoez. “Not long ago, the United States was threatening to take Greenland – fortunately, someone realised it was a very stupid idea to dismantle NATO over a rock – and Russia continues to threaten Europe, plunging ever deeper into the war.”
Faced with “increasingly ridiculous and extravagant actions that are very dangerous for Europeans”, according to the French analyst, France’s unprecedented move was the only way forward, not least because, as the president himself emphasised, since 2020 “our rivals have evolved, as have our partners” – a speech which, for Hoez, encapsulates two key ideas. “Macron said not only that he will increase the number of nuclear warheads, but also that he will no longer disclose their number, and that is one of the most important points: in the context of MAD theory, there must be strategic ambiguity; our rivals cannot simply know what to expect in order to eliminate us.”
But the most important sentence in the whole speech, argues Hoez, was not even that: it was the blunt warning issued by Macron when he said that anyone wishing to attack France or its allies knows the price they will have to pay. “It is a threat to everyone, not just Iran, Russia or China, but to everyone – including the US, which not so long ago was preparing to attack the Europeans. Now we will have France as the leading nuclear power in the European Union and also a great opportunity to involve the UK in this and gradually integrate it into the European defence apparatus.”
The problems ahead
Work is due to begin immediately. Over the coming weeks and months, the countries involved in the new ‘forward deterrence’ doctrine will have much to negotiate and many details to finalise, including where the warheads will be deployed, the rotation of French strategic air forces, which protect the nuclear arsenal, the establishment of security protocols, stricter controls, and how France will relate to the other countries – particularly because, as Emmanuel Macron was keen to emphasise, he and whoever succeeds him in 2027 will always have the final say on the use of these weapons.
Alongside this, the seven countries in dialogue with Paris will have to consider strengthening their own armed forces and determine how and when the military presence surrounding the nuclear arsenal will be reinforced, which necessitates renewed debates on military cooperation – “both at EU level and outside the NATO framework”, notes Julien Hoez, “because, once again, we cannot rely on the US”.
“I would say that these discussions will take place over the coming months and, furthermore, there is a whole range of topics to debate and negotiate, from closer cooperation between France and Germany to the new nuclear ballistic missile submarines, which are due to go into construction shortly, and a fairer distribution of defence efforts, the establishment of missile factories, task forces for military operations, and more robust military forces at European level… All these aspects highlight the difficulties that lie ahead.”
With so many challenges, is it possible that the European Union – which was never established as a military power nor has it ever had a truly collective defence – might establish itself as a power? Hoez believes it is possible, but we will have to wait and see – in particular, wait for the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12 April.
“Hungary has been the main blocking force, but if, on 12 April, Péter Magyar defeats Viktor Orbán – and Orbán does not behave like Putin in order to remain in power – there is a good chance that the European Council will be able to amend the treaties and make progress on the issues that have been blocked, such as moving to qualified majority voting and abolishing the mandatory veto,” says the expert.
“All of this has depended on Orbán being in power. And that could change with Magyar, who presents himself as pro-European, in favour of adopting the euro, in favour of a more pro-Ukraine stance, and highly critical of Orbán’s confrontation with EU partners and his closeness to Russia. But everything will depend on internal pressures, the support Magyar receives from Member States, and whether – or not – he manages to secure a majority.”